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Abstract 
This paper presents an optimization framework for a load aggregator participating in the wholesale power market and the 
regulation capacity market. The objective of the aggregator is to minimize the total energy costs of a portfolio of energy 
consumers. The market organization is based on the Nordic model. The optimization model includes a detailed representation of 
the physical system at each consumer. Flexibility may come from load reductions, substitutions between energy carriers and from 
use of energy storage. A case study is performed using actual data from a set of Norwegian electricity consumers to test the 
model and estimate the value of aggregation in the current market framework.  
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of RERC 2014. 
Keywords: Ancillary services; Load management;Power Markets; Smart grid. 
1. Introduction 
Balancing and regulating power systems becomes increasingly challenging with increasing shares of variable 
renewable energy (VRE), and increased flexibility of energy consumption is one of the options for handling this 
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challenge. Procurement of regulation power and other ancillary services from flexible electricity consumers has 
been explored in different power systems today, especially in the USA (e.g.[1] and [2]). Enhancement of demand 
flexibility and its utilization for power system regulation is also relevant for the Nordic countries, as described in [3] 
and [4]. An aggregator is an agent that takes the responsibility for planning and operation of several small and 
medium flexible consumption units within one distribution network [5]. Optimizing several load profiles with 
respect to several markets is not straightforward. Previous research has addressed some aspects of load aggregation 
and market participation of demand flexibility, such as optimal bidding of flexible consumers into the wholesale 
power market [6] and aggregator’s participation in the wholesale power market [7] and [8]. In this paper we develop 
a detailed optimization model for a load aggregator with regard to simultaneous participation in the wholesale power 
market and the regulation capacity market. The market participation is modeled in the context of the Nordic power 
market using a deterministic approach. The model is applied to quantify and compare the value of load control and 
aggregation for a real portfolio of medium-size flexible electricity consumers in Norway. 
Nomenclature 
EES Electric Energy Storage 
F ELty ,  input of electricity from grid into system y at hour t 
ODISty ,  discharge of EES into system y at hour t 
OCHARt  charge of EES at hour t 
K ELy  efficiency of electricity conversion in system y 
Wy,l,t load prognosis for load l in system y at hour t 
SSCHtay ,,  scheduled substitution of energy from electricity by energy from carrier a 
SPOTtay ,,  potential substitution of energy from electricity by energy from carrier a 
ZSCHtly ,,  scheduled load reduction of load l in system y at hour t 
ZPOTtly ,,  potential load reduction of load l in system y at hour t 
SCH
tlyR ,,  reconnection top from a scheduled load reduction in system y at hour t. 
V RPt  volume of up-regulating power available from the portfolio per hour 
V RPO  weekly capacity reserved for up-regulation 
T ly ,  cost of load reduction 
PCARRa  price of an input unit of energy for carrier a 
PELt  hourly electricity price 
PRPO  reserved capacity price 
IRPO capacity market income 
φ significance of the undelivered reserve penalty on the weekly option market 
Ψt volume of unavailable up-regulation capacity 
1.1. Nordic wholesale electricity market and regulation power market 
The Nordic wholesale electricity market (Elspot) operates on a day-ahead basis with hourly resolution. The 
participants submit their bids for the following day before 12:00, and the cleared hourly prices and volumes are 
published around 12:30. The type of bid on Nordic wholesale electricity market that is most suited for bidding 
flexible electricity demand, is a price dependent single hourly order – an hourly bid that may consist of up to 62 
price steps with corresponding volumes. Using this bid type the actors can hedge themselves from high power 
prices.  
Regulation capacity market is used for procurement of the tertiary regulation service. Tertiary regulation can be 
provided by generation and consumption units that are able to respond to a system signal within 15 minutes and 
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remain activated for at least 1 hour. Market participants receive a capacity payment for reservation of regulation 
capacity during a specified period (a day, a week or a season). Providers of accepted capacity bids are obliged to bid 
regulation power into the common Nordic Regulating Power Market during the whole specified period. The bid 
price on the Regulating Power Market (RPM) reflects the activation cost of the reserve, and all activated reserve 
providers receive the marginal price. If hourly regulation capacity is unavailable or below the level stated in the 
capacity bid, the provider receives a penalty for undelivered reserve, i.e. there is a capacity payment reduction. 
Specific rules for the capacity market vary between the Nordic countries. In our work we use the Norwegian 
approach where the option market clearing takes place weekly and the minimum bid volume on the regulating 
power market is 10 MW. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Model description 
The model is formulated as a deterministic mixed integer linear programming problem with an objective to 
minimize the total portfolio cost by optimally allocating consumer flexibility between the markets. The customers in 
the aggregator’s portfolio are medium and large electricity consumers. The load aggregator is assumed to have a 
communication and control infrastructure to the customers, and manages the total power purchase on the day-ahead 
market as well as delivers tertiary up-regulation service via the RPM (Fig.1a). The model has an hourly time 
resolution.  
We adopt an approach of physically based modeling of consumer flexibility from [9] and [10]. The energy 
system of each customer is represented by a set of subsystems (Fig. 1b). Each subsystem includes a set of loads and 
converters. A load is defined as demand for an energy service and a converter is an electric installation with a 
specified conversion efficiency that supplies the load. For example, a heating load may be supplied by two 
converters – an electric boiler and an oil boiler. This representation makes it possible to capture flexibility that 
comes from energy carrier substitution.  
As shown in Fig. 1, the aggregator can also operate an electric energy storage (EES) located in the same 
distribution grid as the portfolio customers. For this purpose one can use a stationary EES such as a lead acid battery 
pack, a lithium ion battery pack, or a non-stationary EES such as plug-in electric vehicles. We model a stationary 
EES applying the same modeling technique as described in [11]. 
The model ensures that in each subsystem y there must be a balance between the total input of energy carriers and 
the total load plus possible reconnection tops (1). 
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Fig.1. (a) conceptual framework for the optimization model; (b) generic representation of physical energy systems in the model. 
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2.2. Modelling flexibility allocation between the markets 
Different options for flexibility allocation defined in the model are shown in Fig.2. Utilization of flexibility on the 
day-ahead wholesale market requires scheduling of load reductions and/or energy carrier substitutions, as well as 
scheduling of the use of storage. On the other hand, capacity reserved for the weekly regulating power market comes 
from potential load reductions and potential energy carrier substitutions that are still available after the scheduling 
has taken place. When an actor participates in both markets, the challenge is to determine an optimal scheduling 
plan for the whole week so that there is still capacity available for delivery of the regulation reserve.  
Scheduled and potential load reductions as well as a trade-off between them, are modeled using a modelling 
approach with binary variables described in [10]. The volume of up-regulating power available from the portfolio 
per hour is found in (2) as the sum of all potential load reductions and all potential energy carrier substitutions. 
Constraint (3) ensures that this volume does not exceed the total power input at hour t. The weekly capacity bid VRPO 
may be set higher than the available up-regulating volumeV RPt , but in this case the actor gets a penalty for the 
unavailable regulation capacity Ψt, as defined in (4). 
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2.3. Objective function 
The objective function (5) is minimizing the total portfolio cost which consists of the cost of power purchase on 
the wholesale power market, the cost of energy carriers used for scheduled substitutions and the cost of scheduled 
load reductions. The income from the capacity reservation (IRPO) is subtracted from the cost function.  
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The income IRPO is defined in (6). To avoid non-linearities in the model we used an exogenous parameter M which 
controls the significance of the penalty for the undelivered volume Ψt. The default value of M is 0.01 but different 
levels were tested in the case study.  
Fig.2 Matrix of flexibility utilization options defined in the model. 
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3. Case study 
The customer portfolio in the case study is composed of 9 medium-size commercial electricity consumers 
including shopping centers, food production sites, district heating site and greenhouses. Flexibility comes from 
reducing heating loads, substitution between electricity and oil/gas in providing energy for heating loads, reducing 
air conditioning and reducing lightning. Hourly electricity consumption data is obtained from an existing 
commercial database of Enfo Consulting AS1. The cost of load reduction for medium commercial electricity 
consumers is set to 127 €/MWh based on [12] and [13]. Sensitivity analyses for cost levels 0 €/MWh and 64 €/MWh 
are performed. The cost of using a lead-acid based EES is calculated to be 157 €/MWh based on [11] and [14]. 
Prices for electricity, oil, gas and regulation capacity used are obtained from [15], [16], [17] and [18].  
The model is applied to simulate flexibility utilization on the power markets for two selected time periods; weeks 
2 – 6 in 2011 and 2012. These periods were chosen because of illustratively different price development: In 2011 the 
price level was high but within-day price variations were small; in 2012 the price level was lower but within-day 
price variations were larger. The capacity payments were significantly higher in 2012 and gradually increasing over 
the period from week 2 to 6. In 2011 the capacity payments remained at rather low levels for the entire period. The 
following simulation cases were defined: 
x Base case – no aggregation 
x Participation on the wholesale power market 
x Participation on the wholesale power market and regulation capacity market 
For each case, several subcases were tested to determine the value of using EES and the value of installing an 
automatic control - implying an extended availability of flexibility outside the ordinary working hours. 
4. Simulation results and discussion 
4.1. Flexibility allocation  
Fig. 3a shows a typical daily pattern of the portfolio flexibility allocation for the weekdays in 2012 for the 
simulation case where the aggregator participates in both markets. The simulated total portfolio electricity 
consumption during the working hours is around 8-9.5 MWh/h and the flexibility share is around 5-6 MWh/h. Most 
of this flexibility comes from energy carrier substitutions, but there are also load reductions between hours 11 – 17. 
A small share of flexibility utilization is scheduled for usual peak price hours during the day (see Elspot prices in 
Fig. 3b). However the model chooses to reserve most of the flexibility for the up-regulation reserve. The 
corresponding weekly capacity bid is shown in Fig. 2b and is around 3.5 MW. This volume does not always 
correspond to the hourly regulation power available, so a penalty for the unavailable capacity is expected in hours 5 
– 6 and 20 – 24. 
4.2. Value of load control and aggregation 
The total portfolio costs for all simulation cases for the five week periods are shown in Table 1. The average 
electricity price level was higher in 2011 and the total portfolio costs are hence generally higher that year. 
 
 
1Enfo Consulting AS is a Norwegian company that develops Smart Grid solutions and i.a. delivers control systems for flexible electric loads. 
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Fig.4. (a) sensitivity of the portfolio cost to the cost of load reduction; (b) sensitivity of capacity market income to the significance of penalty 
for unavailable regulation capacity 
Table 1.Comparison of the total portfolio cost in different cases. 
Case Portfolio cost, 
2011, 1000 EUR 
Portfolio cost, 
2012, 1000 EUR 
1. Base case 410,91 317,00 
2. Participation in the wholesale power market   
 non-auto system, no EES 410,91 316,94 
non-auto system, with EES 410,91 316,90 
auto system, no EES 410,91 316,81 
auto system, with EES 410,91 316,71 
3. Participation in the wholesale power market and regulation capacity market   
non-auto system, no EES 410,53 314,18 
non-auto system, with EES 410,53 314,18 
auto system, no EES 409,19 303,77 
auto system, with EES 409,19 303,74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The value of flexibility scheduling for the wholesale power market alone is close to zero both years, unless an 
automatic control and an ESS are used. Still we see that larger within-day price variations in 2012 tend to increase 
the value of aggregator’s participation in the wholesale power market. Due to increasing wind power investments 
and more transmission capacity to Continental Europe, the Norwegian within-day price variations are expected to 
increase in the future, and the value of demand flexibility use on the markets is hence also likely to increase. 
Participation in the both markets during the 5-week period in 2011 gives the aggregator a small value of €1720 
(0.4% portfolio cost reduction). However in 2012, participation in both markets gives a value of €13260 due to 
higher capacity payments (4% portfolio cost reduction). Fig. 4a shows the results of the sensitivity analysis for 
different reduction cost levels.  
Fig.3. (a) modelled flexibility allocation, average for the weekdays in 2012, subcase with no EES, non-automatic control, load reduction 
cost 64 EUR/MWh; (b) optimal weekly capacity bid, average for the weekdays in 2012, subcase with no EES, non-automatic control, load 
reduction cost 64 EUR/MWh. 
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Analysis of the case study simulations shows that one of the reasons for a rather low profitability of the 
regulation capacity market today is definition of the market periods. Most small and medium commercial electricity 
consumers have flexibility available during normal working hours. Outside these hours they would incur significant 
penalties for non-complying with their obligations on the weekly capacity market. The significance of penalty for 
the unavailable regulation reserve turns out to be very high (Fig 4b), and seems to be crucial for the income of small 
and medium consumers as those included in this portfolio. The simulations showed that the use of automatic control 
and EES can increase the aggregator’s value by up to 3%. Increasing availability of flexibility due to automatic 
control has a stronger effect in the model than utilization of the ESS. This is largely due to the high cost of the 
chosen lead-acid storage technology.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents a methodological framework for the optimal allocation of flexibility by an aggregator 
participating in the wholesale power market and the regulation capacity market. It includes a detailed representation 
of the physical system at each consumer which allows an accurate modelling of different flexibility sources.  
The model is tested using actual data from a set of Norwegian electricity consumers to estimate the value of load 
aggregation and market participation, as well as the value of utilizing electric energy storage and automatic control. 
The simulations show that the aggregator’s value largely depends on within-day price variations, flexibility 
availability and definition of market periods. The Norwegian power market has generally low short term price 
volatility, but still, in the simulations for a 5-week period in 2012 we find a portfolio cost reduction potential of 4% 
 In most cases a mix of load reductions in the wholesale spot market and the regulating reserve market is found to 
be optimal, illustrating the importance of considering both types of markets for a load aggregator. The aggregator’s 
penalty for the unavailable regulation capacity is found to be critical to the potential for small and medium 
consumers attending the market. Furthermore, the optimal allocation between participation in wholesale electricity 
market and the tertiary regulating market depends to a large degree on the consumer’s cost of load reduction. 
Electricity storage is generally found too costly to be activated given realistic storage cost levels. However due to 
technological progress, this may be a more economically interesting option in the future. 
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